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What factors determine whether and how deeply countries will commit to the international human rights regime? Using data for up to 142 countries between 1966 and 2000, this article analyzes patterns of membership to the International Human Rights Covenants. The analysis produced two main conclusions. First, the potential costs associated with joining a treaty, rather than its substantive content, motivates the decision to join. Treaties that protect different rights but establish comparable implementation mechanisms exhibit similar patterns of membership, whereas treaties that protect identical rights but establish different implementation provisions exhibit dissimilar patterns of membership. Second, rates of treaty membership differ by level of commitment. Countries that sign human rights treaties differ from countries that ratify. Results are interpreted with respect to four theories of commitment and compliance: realism, liberalism, constructivism, and sociological institutionalism. Theories that emphasize the importance of a treaty’s costs (realism and institutionalism) fare better than theories that prioritize a treaty’s content (liberalism and constructivism).

KEY WORDS: human rights; international membership; political sociology; ratification; surveillance; treaties.

INTRODUCTION

What factors determine how deeply—if at all—countries will commit to the global human rights regime? Sociologists, political scientists, and legal scholars have sought to explain why countries ratify human rights treaties, especially given the potential sovereignty costs of joining (Cole, 2005; Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006; Hathaway, 2002; Vreeland, 2008; Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008). Evidence consistently shows that even the world’s most repressive regimes join human rights treaties, often at rates equal to rights-protecting countries (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007; Hafner-Burton et al., 2008). Nevertheless, existing research typically (and incorrectly) fails to account for...

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variation in the strength of a country's commitment to human rights treaties (Goodman and Jinks, 2003). Most analysts regard treaty membership as a binary condition—either a state is or is not a party—even though options exist for countries to express their nonbinding endorsement of, or qualified commitment to, a treaty.

Keith (1999:101), for example, analyzed ratification of human rights treaties but explicitly disregarded signature, noting that “states that have signed but have never formally ratified treaties are non-party states because the treaties are not legally binding upon them.” Hathaway (2003a:189) similarly focused exclusively on ratification because it indicates a country’s “formal acceptance of international human rights law.” Although recent studies have begun to distinguish signature and ratification (Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006; Vreeland, 2008), they have done so for only one human rights treaty and have not theorized the conditions under which countries are expected to sign rather than ratify (or vice versa).

The analyses presented in this article bring theories of commitment and compliance to bear on the decision of countries to sign or ratify three core human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, known collectively as the International Human Rights Covenants. I consider how two dimensions of treaty commitment—level of membership to a treaty and the degree to which a treaty is monitored—intersect to describe the “depth” of a country’s endorsement of human rights. Using data for up to 142 countries between 1966 and 2000, I analyze whether levels of membership vary systematically with the strength of treaties’ surveillance mechanisms. Are countries reluctant to make legally binding commitments to treaties that are closely monitored?

HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: AN OVERVIEW

A majority of the world’s states have joined at least one of the International Human Rights Covenants. Blau and Moncada (2007a:369) posit that widespread membership to these and other treaties has produced “a human rights culture [that] becomes a prophylactic against abuses in the future.” Likewise, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) conclude that human rights treaties have a diffuse Durkheimian effect on country-level practices—as more countries join a treaty, it begins to transform the behaviors of parties and non-parties alike. Most research, however, gives reason to be more pessimistic.

The ineffectiveness of human rights treaties has led sociologists to explore new ways of enforcing them. A recent exchange between Blau and Moncada (2007a,b) and Hagan and Levi (2007) in the pages of this journal debates one such possibility: the constitutionalization of human rights treaties (i.e., the

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3 A second optional protocol to the ICCPR, adopted in 1989, prohibits capital punishment.
incorporation of treaty provisions into a country’s constitution). This idea turns on the assumption that “human rights without the support of a sovereign state … are merely abstract claims that cannot be enforced” (Turner, 2006:3).

Blau and Moncada concede that human rights treaties depend on states for enforcement, but they suggest that individuals need not rely on their own states for protection. Other states may, under certain conditions, legitimately intervene. Because endorsement of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights is nearly universal, countries that have constitutionalized it are automatically vested with the international jurisdiction to prosecute human rights violations worldwide (Blau and Moncada, 2007a:367). In this respect, criminalizing human rights violations simply extends a precedent established by the prosecution of humanitarian law violations in domestic courts.4

Regardless of whether one agrees with this proposition—and Hagan and Levi (2007) express doubts—it is important to note that a state’s incorporation of the Universal Declaration into domestic law is not sufficient to confer international jurisdiction. The declaration is a “soft-law” document that is purely aspirational—it is not justiciable. Therefore, in addition to the Universal Declaration, states must also constitutionalize a “relevant UN human rights treaty” (Blau and Moncada, 2007a:367). Human rights treaties are legally binding and independently monitored, and as such constitute “hard law” (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). The Universal Declaration fails on both counts: adherence is not legally binding and compliance is not formally monitored.

To convert the Universal Declaration into hard law, the United Nations adopted the two human rights covenants in 1966: one (the ICESCR) focuses on socioeconomic rights; the other (the ICCPR) enumerates civil and political rights. The covenants were originally envisaged as a single treaty. Separate covenants were ultimately adopted not because liberal Western countries opposed socioeconomic rights, as is commonly supposed, but because economic and social rights are presumably more costly to implement and therefore more difficult to enforce (Craven, 1995; Dennis and Stewart, 2004; Whelan and Donnelly, 2007).

The debate over constitutionalizing human rights treaties presupposes that the treaties have been joined, a fact that Blau and Moncada acknowledge with respect to the reluctance of the United States to endorse most human rights accords. Unlike the Universal Declaration, not all countries have joined the human rights covenants, and even fewer have incurred legal obligations by ratifying them. The question then becomes: What prompts countries to join human rights treaties in the first place? Different levels of commitment matter, as do the mechanisms in place to monitor compliance. Although Blau and

4 Blau and Moncada (2007b) lament that corporations possess personhood rights under the U.S. Constitution. However, they neglect to consider that treating states as “persons” under international law buttresses their case for criminalizing human rights violations. Just as individual heads of state can be prosecuted by foreign courts for violations of humanitarian law, courts may find it easier to prosecute states qua persons for violations of human rights law.
Moncada (2007a) rightly note that the treaty bodies charged with monitoring compliance lack the legal authority to enforce their decisions, not all surveillance and enforcement mechanisms are created equal—some are more invasive than others. However ineffective treaty bodies may be at enforcing human rights treaties, I show that they nevertheless shape patterns of treaty membership.

LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING RESEARCH ON TREATY MEMBERSHIP

Existing research on the determinants of treaty membership is limited in two respects. First, researchers typically regard human rights treaties as functionally equivalent and analytically transposable, ignoring crucial differences in their implementation mechanisms and substantive content. Wotipka and Tsutsui (2008), for example, conducted an event-history analysis to examine rates of ratification for seven different human rights treaties. Their analysis rested on the assumption that “all the events, that is, ratification of any of the seven human rights treaties, are considered equivalent” (Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008:740). Analyzing the same treaties, Hafner-Burton et al. (2008) described the level of a country’s commitment to the international human rights regime by tallying how many it had ratified.

Both methods for operationalizing membership and commitment are rooted in the assumption that human rights treaties are interchangeable and additively separable despite substantial differences in content and implementation. Human rights treaties codify a diversity of rights appertaining to different categories of persons, and some enjoy more support than others. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, has 191 parties after only a decade in force, but is also among the most heavily “reserved” human rights treaties (Neumayer, 2007). The anti-apartheid convention, by contrast, has been ratified by only 101 countries in three decades, but these countries have entered few reservations. These treaties also differ with respect to the procedures they establish for monitoring compliance—some are more invasive than others—which might also account for variation in rates of membership to them.

A second limitation is that researchers have tended to focus exclusively on ratification, ignoring different levels of treaty membership. Although two recent studies have analyzed rates of signature and ratification separately (Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006; Vreeland, 2008), they did so for only one treaty and therefore cannot determine whether variation in the content or implementation of human rights treaties influences patterns of membership. The difference between signature and ratification also remains undertheorized in these studies, as neither predicts nor explains why the likelihood of signing and ratifying might differ.

My analysis is designed to disentangle the effects of treaty content and invasiveness on different levels of membership. The ICESCR and ICCPR
protect qualitatively different rights but are monitored using similar mecha-
nisms. Conversely, the content of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol is
identical—the protocol does not include additional rights—but their monitor-
ing and enforcement mechanisms differ substantially.

DIMENSIONS OF TREATY COMMITMENT

Level of Membership

Level of membership refers to the extent of a state’s commitment to a
treaty. When confronted with a treaty, countries may decline to join, sign, rat-
ify with reservations, or ratify unconditionally. Signing a treaty incurs a
weaker obligation under international law than does ratification. According to
the U.N. Treaty Handbook (2001:3), “a signing State does not undertake posi-
tive legal obligations under the treaty upon signature. … [Signature] allows
States time to seek approval for the treaty at the domestic level and to enact
any legislation necessary to implement the treaty domestically, prior to under-
taking the legal obligations under the treaty at the international level.” Ratifi-
cation, conversely, binds a country legally to the terms of a treaty.

“Ratification … refer[s] to the act undertaken on the international plane,
whereby a State establishes its consent to be bound by a treaty … Once a
State has ratified a treaty at the international level, it must give effect to the
treaty domestically. Upon ratification, the State becomes legally bound under
the treaty” (United Nations, 2001:6, 60).5

Ratification is not an all-or-nothing commitment, however. States that ratify
a treaty can exempt themselves from specific provisions by entering reservations.
Reservations, similar in function to a line-item veto, render entire portions of a
treaty nonbinding but leave its remainder intact. Although scholars debate the
validity and even the legality of treaty reservations (Bradley and Goldsmith, 2000;
Goodman, 2002; Lijnzaad, 1995; Swaine, 2006), the fact remains that countries
routinely soften or “hedge” their treaty commitments by entering reservations.

Level of Surveillance

Unlike level of membership, which describes a country’s relationship with
or commitment to a treaty, level of surveillance is a property of the treaty
itself. Treaty abrogation is costly only if violations are detected and sanc-
tioned, and the International Human Rights Covenants can be ranked by the
relative strength of their provisions for monitoring compliance (Cole, 2005).
As such, the treaties differ in terms of the “sovereignty costs” associated with

5 Ratification includes accession, which combines signature and ratification into a single act, and
succession, whereby a newly established state accepts the treaty obligations of its predecessor.
membership. Three primary forms of implementation mechanisms exist: reporting, whereby states describe the measures taken to execute a treaty; state-to-state complaints, which are rarely used; and individual petitions, the strongest and most invasive form of implementation.

The ICESCR establishes the weakest mechanisms, stipulating that “States parties undertake to submit periodic reports to the Committee [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] within two years of the entry into force of the Covenant … and thereafter once every five years outlining the legislative, judicial, policy and other measures which they have taken to ensure the enjoyment of the rights contained in the Covenant.” These reports, when they are submitted at all, are often perfunctory (Donnelly, 2003). Moreover, reports mandated by the ICESCR are due at routine intervals, giving repressive governments ample time to prepare statements that present themselves in the best possible light.

The ICCPR’s monitoring provisions are only slightly more invasive, empowering its own oversight body, the Human Rights Committee, to solicit reports from parties “whenever the Committee so requests” (Article 40). In addition, a state that has issued a formal declaration under Article 41 of the ICCPR “recognizes the competence of the [Human Rights] Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant” (Article 41). This state-to-state grievance provision has never been and is unlikely ever to be invoked (Leckie, 1988).

The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR establishes the strongest surveillance and enforcement procedures, authorizing the Human Rights Committee to receive petitions from individuals claiming abuse of their treaty-protected rights. According to Article 1, a “State Party to the … Protocol recognizes the competence of the [Human Rights] Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the [ICCPR].” Unlike the state-to-state grievance provision of its “parent” treaty, the individual complaint mechanism established by the Optional Protocol has been used extensively (Cole, 2006). As of May 2004, the Committee had received 1,279 communications submitted by individuals from 77 different countries, leading Craven (1995:33) to conclude that “[p]etition systems … are generally considered the most effective means for the protection of human rights.”

**Strength of Commitment**

I propose that the strength of a state’s commitment to a treaty ranges from “hard” to “soft” based on the nexus between level of membership and

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level of surveillance. Figure 1 cross-classifies these two dimensions of treaty commitment. Level of membership—signature, conditional ratification, and unconditional ratification—is stacked on the vertical axis. Level of surveillance, which varies by treaty, is arrayed horizontally. Strength of commitment ranges from signature of an ineffectual treaty (“soft” endorsement) to unconditional ratification of a well-monitored treaty (“hard” obligation). A number of intermediate options are also possible, as when states make a strong commitment to a weakly monitored treaty or a purely symbolic commitment to a well-monitored treaty. I refer to these options as “ritualized commitments” because they give only a superficial impression of deep commitment. Few negative consequences attach to unqualified ratification of the ICESCR, as compliance is neither well monitored nor strongly enforced. Similarly, countries that sign the Optional Protocol express their rhetorical support of the treaty but do not formally accept the Human Rights Committee’s competence to receive individual complaints.

THEORIZING PATTERNS OF TREATY MEMBERSHIP

By examining rates of membership across treaties that protect different rights and establish different mechanisms for monitoring compliance, it becomes possible to adjudicate opposing theories of commitment to international treaty regimes. Recent scholarship on human rights has focused on four broad theoretical perspectives: realism, liberalism, constructivism, and sociological institutionalism (Hafner-Burton et al., 2008; Schmitz and Sikkink, 2002). These perspectives differ in the assumptions they make regarding countries’ motivations for joining (or not joining) human rights treaties as well as in their predictions regarding countries’ intentions to comply with treaties that are joined. Most theories assume that the decision to join a treaty is motivated either by the logic of expected consequences or the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998). On the one hand, countries weigh the anticipated

![Fig. 1. Cross-classifying level of treaty surveillance (horizontal axis) and level of commitment (vertical axis).](image-url)
outcomes of treaty membership and make decisions that are shaped by the imperatives of power, interests, and political expediency. On the other hand, countries are guided by identity-based considerations such as norms, culture, and ultimate values. In turn, treaty commitments can be sincere or cynical, reflecting either genuine intentions or cheap talk.

For both realists and liberalists, the decision to join human rights treaties is motivated by the expected payoffs of treaty membership; however, the former see treaty commitments as disingenuous while the latter view them as genuine. Alternatively, constructivists and institutionalists both contend that logics of appropriateness account for membership to human rights treaties, although intentions to comply are considered to be earnest for norm-based theorists but often perfunctory for institutional theorists.

**Realism**

*Countries join human rights treaties when the anticipated benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.* Realists posit that states, when deciding whether to join a treaty, calculate the potential benefits and expected costs of joining. Treaty membership is effectively costless when (1) a country’s laws and practices conform *a priori* to treaty provisions, even in the absence of enforcement; (2) non-compliance is not detected or, if detected, is not sanctioned; or (3) joining does not impose any legal obligations to comply.

The first condition describes “least-cost compliers” (Hathaway, 2002). Because the decision to join a treaty is voluntary, states need not adopt treaties that run counter to their interests. The second condition implies that repressive states will join human rights treaties only when accountability regimes are weak, so that treaty membership amounts to little more than an “empty promise” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). According to Hechter (1987:11): “Compliance requires formal controls. Some agency … must have the ability to monitor and punish the noncompliant.” Absent effective monitoring and the capacity to sanction violations, rights-abusing countries can join treaties with relative impunity. The third condition speaks to different levels of treaty commitment. Countries that lack the will or ability to implement a treaty can sign it or ratify with reservations, as these options do not create a legal obligation to comply. Evidence suggests, however, that repressive countries tend to enter the fewest reservations to human rights treaties (Neumayer, 2007). Taken together, the realist approach predicts that rates of treaty ratification (but not necessarily signature) will be lower for rights-abusing states than for rights-affirming states, especially when treaties are well monitored.8

8 If the expected costs of joining human rights treaties are minimal, what, if any, are the potential benefits? Some researchers have suggested that repressive states enhance their reputations by joining (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007; Hathaway, 2003b). But the benefits of disingenuous commitments are likely to be ephemeral. Noncompliance will eventually damage a government’s credibility, leaving it worse off than before (Burgstaller, 2007).
Liberalism

Countries join human rights treaties to reinforce domestic policies and reforms. Rather than treat states as unitary actors, as realists are prone to do, liberal theorists disaggregate the state to examine the effect of domestic political processes on treaty membership. A number of studies have documented a robust link between democracy and human rights (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Keith, 1999; Neumayer, 2005; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Moravcsik (2000), however, suggests that it is not the presence of democratic institutions per se that leads countries to endorse human rights treaties; indeed, rates of ratification may actually be lower among established democracies precisely because rule-of-law countries take their commitments—and deviations therefrom—seriously (e.g., Hathaway, 2003b, 2007). Instead, ratification of human rights treaties is expected to be most prevalent among newly democratic countries seeking to prevent autocratic backsliding. In countries where domestic accountability mechanisms are weak, reformers bind themselves (and their successors) to external accountability systems such as treaty regimes. Human rights treaty membership therefore “locks in” liberal reforms by delegating authority and enforcement to international institutions.

Established democracies, conversely, have little to gain and perhaps something to lose from treaty membership. Hathaway (2003b:1856) points out that “democratic nations generally have stronger internal enforcement mechanisms than nondemocratic nations,” causing them to be much more punctilious than autocracies when deciding which treaties to join and how deeply to commit. Although democracies are among the most enthusiastic supporters of human rights, even minor treaty derogations can be costly or embarrassing. These arguments suggest that liberalizing states will ratify closely monitored treaties whereas established democracies will carefully modify their treaty commitments by entering reservations (Hathaway, 2003b; Neumayer, 2007).

Constructivism

Countries join human rights treaties to affirm a sincere commitment to treaty principles. According to norm-based approaches such as constructivism, countries support or oppose treaties purely on substantive grounds, and will join only those treaties that affirm their deep-seated normative, cultural, or ideological commitments. Given the paramount importance of treaty content, norm-based approaches to treaty membership and compliance are premised on the “de-emphasis of formal enforcement measures” (Chayes and Chayes, 1993:204). Genuine treaty commitments render provisions designed to enforce, coerce, or evade compliance unnecessary because “true believers” comply even in the absence of such measures. Countries that join human rights treaties are therefore expected to ratify without qualification regardless of the mechanisms established for monitoring and enforcing compliance.
Not all countries, of course, will choose to join. Human rights norms reflect and are often presumed to be most compatible with Western cultural sensibilities (e.g., Donnelly, 1982; Howard and Donnelly, 1986; Huntington, 1996). Donnelly (2003:69) has nevertheless cautioned that the geographic or cultural source of an idea does not necessarily restrict its applicability. Human rights, he argues, may have originated in Western political thought, but they are certainly relevant and applicable elsewhere. Donnelly also contests the widespread assumption that socioeconomic rights were opposed by countries with market-based economies but supported by the Soviet bloc (Whelan and Donnelly, 2007). My analysis sheds additional evidentiary light on this widely held but rarely examined assumption.

Sociological Institutionalism

Countries join human rights treaties as an expression of legitimate statehood. Sociological institutionalists have shown repeatedly and across a variety of domains that the structures, identities, and activities of contemporary nation-states are shaped not only by social forces operating internally but also by world-cultural models and scripts (Meyer et al., 1997). Human rights principles, in this view, have become a highly institutionalized feature of the world-cultural landscape (Soysal, 1994), so much so that support for human rights is constitutive of statehood. Ritualistic endorsements of human rights treaties offer a relatively low-cost way for countries to enact a legitimate nation-state identity.

Sociological institutionalists therefore expect that most countries, even repressive ones, will demonstrate their support of human rights (Hafner-Burton et al., 2008). Indeed, countries routinely adopt international policies that correspond very little or not at all with domestic realities (Meyer et al., 1997). Still, as organizations writ large, states can sustain extreme forms of hypocrisy only when their deviant behaviors are shielded from rigorous inspection (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Weakly monitored treaties enable decoupling of this sort, as do purely expressive or qualified treaty commitments that allow rights-abusing countries to align themselves with human rights norms while circumventing the legal obligation to abide by those norms.

DATA AND METHOD

Dependent Variables

To analyze in what capacity and at what rate countries join the International Human Rights Covenants, two dummy variables are coded 1 the year a country respectively signed or ratified each treaty, and 0 the years preceding signature or ratification. An additional dummy variable, ratification without
reservations, is coded 1 if a country ratifies a treaty unconditionally—that is, without entering reservations—or when it rescinds all existing reservations. Ratification without reservations is therefore a subset of ratification. Dates of signature and ratification were obtained from reports issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.\(^9\)

There are three “risk sets” for each treaty: one each for signature, ratification, and ratification without reservations. The ICESCR and ICCPR were opened for signature in 1966; countries established after 1966 enter the analyses upon independence. Countries become eligible to sign or ratify the Optional Protocol only after they have joined the ICCPR. Countries that sign a treaty are subsequently removed from the corresponding risk set for signature but remain eligible to ratify the treaty. Because ratification supersedes signature, countries that ratify a treaty without first signing it (i.e., countries that “accede” to the treaty) are also removed from the analysis of signatures. The ratification-without-reservations risk set includes (1) countries that have yet to join a treaty in any capacity; (2) countries that have signed but not ratified a treaty; and (3) countries that have ratified a treaty with reservations. Countries that do not sign or ratify the treaties by 2000, the end of the observation period, are right-censored.

I use event-history analysis (Allison, 1984; Tuma and Hannan, 1984) to estimate the rate at which countries sign or ratify the ICESCR, ICCPR, or Optional Protocol. Consistent with previous analyses of treaty ratification (e.g., Cole, 2005; Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008), I use a constant rate framework to model the rate of treaty membership as an exponential function of covariates. The analysis consists of nine identically specified regression models—one for each combination of treaty (ICESCR, ICCPR, Optional Protocol) and level of commitment (signature, ratification, unqualified ratification).

**Independent and Control Variables**

Table I describes the independent and control variables used in the analyses. Two measures gauge the extent to which a country’s practices and procedures comport with the substantive content and fundamental intent of human rights treaties. The first, *human rights score*, operationalizes level of respect for civil and political rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). The second, *democracy score*, refers to the presence of institutionalized constraints on executive power, procedures that allow citizens to express preferences for policies and leadership, and universal guarantees of basic civil liberties (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Ratification is presumably less costly for countries scoring highly on these indices, so positive effects can be attributed to realist processes.

A variable derived from the democracy score, *regime liberalization*, measures the direction and magnitude of regime changes from one year to the

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism Human rights practices</strong></td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,217</td>
<td>Ordinal measure drawn from reports issued by Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Higher values represent better human rights practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy/autocracy</strong></td>
<td>−.38</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>−10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>Measure of institutionalized democracy from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Ranges from −10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberalism Liberalization</strong></td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>−18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>Annual deviations in a country’s democracy/autocracy score indicating the direction and magnitude of regime changes. Positive values indicate regime liberalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism Communist (1966–1989)</strong></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>1 = communist between 1966 and 1989; 0 = not (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2004; Perrett and Hogg, 1989).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism Communist (1990–2000)</strong></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>1 = communist between 1990 and 2000; 0 = not (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2004; Perrett and Hogg, 1989).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism West</strong></td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>1 = Western country; 0 = non-Western country (Henderson and Tucker, 2001; Huntington, 1996; Russett et al., 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sociological institutionalism INGO linkages (in 100s)</strong></td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35.23</td>
<td>5,459</td>
<td>Number of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that count at least one national a member (Boli and Thomas, 1999). Data from the <em>Yearbook of International Organizations</em> (UIA, various years), available annually from 1982 onward; missing data for the periods 1966–1976 and 1977–1981 substituted with 1976 and 1978 counts, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newly independent</strong></td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>1 = first 3 years following independence; else = 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density of ICESCR ratifications</strong></td>
<td>71.49</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>Total number of ICESCR ratifications in force at ( t - 1 ).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
next. Liberal theory is supported if ratification rates increase as countries liberalize (i.e., as regime change scores increase).

Another set of variables indicates a country’s ideological and cultural commitments. Two dummy variables for communist states (CIA, 2004; Perrett and Hogg, 1989)—one each to signify whether a country was ruled by a communist regime during and after the Cold War—evaluate whether support for socioeconomic rights is ideologically motivated, leading to higher rates of ICESCR ratification. Another indicator assesses whether Western states, defined as Western European countries and their settler derivatives in North
America and Australasia (Henderson and Tucker, 2001; Huntington, 1996; Russett et al., 2000), are more supportive than non-Western countries of civil and political rights, contributing to higher rates of ICCPR and Optional Protocol ratification.

Institutionalist arguments are operationalized in three ways. First, world polity theorists posit that international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are carriers of world-cultural norms such as human rights (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004), and consequently expect that as the number of a country’s INGO linkages increases, the likelihood that it joins human rights treaties correspondingly increases. Second, an indicator variable ascertains whether newly independent countries join human rights treaties as an affirmation of liberal statehood or to signal their support of legitimating norms (Meyer et al., 1997). Third, cumulative counts for the world-level density of signatures and ratifications for each treaty model global diffusion or “bandwagon” processes (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

Three additional variables—ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), GDP per capita (World Bank, 2002), and population size (Banks, 1999)—are included as controls. Several analyses have found that ethnic diversity, economic scarcity, and population size contribute to greater levels of instability, which in turn produce higher levels of government repression (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007; Henderson, 1993; Keith, 1999; Melander, 2005; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994).10

DESCRIPTIVE TRENDS

Number of Signatures and Ratifications

The analysis begins with an overview of treaty membership patterns. Figure 2 depicts the dependent variables—the yearly number of signatures, conditional ratifications (i.e., with reservations), and unconditional ratifications for the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Optional Protocol. More than half of all ICESCR and ICCPR signatures and nearly half of Optional Protocol signatures were deposited within two years of the treaties’ adoption in 1966. Virtually no countries signed the covenants after their entry into force in 1976, although a few countries did so in the 1990s. Conversely, ratification was most prevalent soon after the covenants entered into force, in 1978, and again during the early 1990s, when many of the newly independent countries of the former Soviet bloc ratified.

These trends suggest that countries were hesitant to ratify the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Optional Protocol immediately after they were adopted by the United Nations. Given the uncertainty surrounding these new and potentially

10 Population size also controls for a simple law of probability: the more people in a country, the more opportunities there are for repression (Henderson, 1993).
invasive treaty regimes, “first movers” opted to avoid incurring hard legal obligations. The early and overwhelming endorsement of the covenants—with 19 countries signing the ICESCR and ICCPR in 1968 alone—reduced uncertainty about the treaties, inspired confidence in them, and prompted countries to begin ratifying. Once the critical threshold of entry into force was reached, countries eschewed signature in favor of immediate ratification. As soon as the human rights covenants became legally binding on existing parties, states began to make legally binding commitments to the covenants.

These patterns of treaty membership lend prima facie support to the institutionalist perspective. The human rights covenants rapidly gained momentum and legitimacy as more countries joined, prompting additional—and stronger—commitments. However, there are limits to this interpretation. Institutionalists underscore the expressive function of treaty membership, as it allows “rights-violating governments to display low-cost legitimating commitments to world norms” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2008:115). I have argued, however, that the costs of membership are not distributed uniformly across treaties. The Optional Protocol establishes stronger implementation provisions than either the ICCPR or the ICESCR. Such provisions make it difficult for rights-violating governments to “decouple” treaty commitments from abusive practices.

For this reason, we should expect to find that rates and patterns of membership to the Optional Protocol distinguish it from treaties with weaker implementation provisions. Figure 2 shows just that. The number of ICESCR ratifications is roughly equivalent to the number of ICCPR ratifications. Fewer countries have joined the Optional Protocol, perhaps because it establishes the most stringent and intrusive monitoring provisions.

Nevertheless, most countries that ratified the Optional Protocol did so unconditionally, without entering reservations. Over the observation period, approximately 80% of Optional Protocol ratifications were entered without reservations, compared with 71% of ICESCR ratifications and 60% of ICCPR ratifications. Well-monitored treaties attract fewer but more decisive ratifications because “treaties with stricter provisions … tend to draw support mainly from countries willing and able to honor the unqualified commitment.” Weakly monitored treaties such as the ICESCR are ratified more often and also with comparatively few reservations because “countries are unlikely to be held accountable to provisions they find offensive or difficult to implement” (Cole, 2005:488–489).

**MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES**

Event-history analyses provide a more rigorous evaluation of treaty membership. Table II presents maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for the characteristics associated with signing, ratifying, and unconditionally ratifying the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Optional Protocol. To aid in the identification of empirical patterns, only statistically significant coefficients are shown and
Table II. Statistically Significant Correlates of Human Rights Treaty Membership, Exponential Event-History Analysis, 1966–2000

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* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).

Notes: Robust standard errors, in parentheses, adjusted for clustering within countries. Bolded entries represent statistically significant positive effects. Statistically nonsignificant coefficients are not reported (see Appendix for the complete table of results). The following variables did not have statistically significant effects in any model: human rights practices, Western countries, density of signatures, GDP per capita (logged), and population (logged).
positive coefficients are bolded to distinguish them clearly from negative coeffi-
cients. (The Appendix presents all coefficient estimates regardless of statistical
significance.)

Patterns of Membership and Commitment

The results of nine regression models—one for each combination of treaty
and level of commitment—are grouped into four clusters based on empirical
patterns that emerged in the analysis: signature of the ICESCR and ICCPR
(Block 1), signature of the Optional Protocol (Block 2), ratification of the
ICESCR and ICCPR with or without reservations (Block 3), and ratification
of the Optional Protocol with or without reservations (Block 4).

Two distinct trends are evident. First, with respect to patterns of treaty
membership, the characteristics of countries that join the ICESCR and ICCPR
are nearly identical but differ in most respects from the characteristics of
countries that join the Optional Protocol. Three factors that contribute to
higher rates of ICESCR and ICCPR ratification with or without reserva-
tions—regime liberalization, newly independent status, and growth in the num-
er of ratifiers worldwide—have no effect on ratification of the Optional
Protocol. Similarly, the propensity to ratify the Optional Protocol increases
with ethnic fractionalization and declines with INGO linkages, but these vari-
able s are unassociated with ratification of the ICESCR or ICCPR. Even more
dramatically, countries that remained communist after 1989 were significantly
more likely to sign the ICESCR and ICCPR but significantly less likely to sign
the Optional Protocol.

Second, vis-à-vis level of treaty commitment, countries that sign the cove-
nants differ in most cases from countries that ratify them, but the same factors
that explain ratification also account for ratification without reservations.
Although post-Soviet communist regimes were significantly less likely than
other countries to ratify the ICESCR and ICCPR with or without reserva-
tions, they were more likely to sign each covenant. Similarly, the likelihood of
ratifying the covenants increased immediately following sovereign indepen-
dence, but independence was unrelated to rates of ICESCR signature and
inversely associated with rates of ICCPR signature. Comparable patterns
differentiate signature and ratification of the Optional Protocol.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} It is important to note exceptions to these overall patterns. In two instances, the effects of a
variable deviate from patterns of treaty commitment: (1) regime liberalization increased rates of
ICCPR signature, but its effect was otherwise confined to ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR;
and (2) ethnic fractionalization had a positive effect on unqualified ratification of the
Optional Protocol but achieved only marginal levels of significance for ratification. Sometimes,
too, a variable behaved similarly for two treaties that otherwise exhibited different membership
patterns: (1) newly independent countries were significantly less likely to sign both the ICCPR
and its Optional Protocol; (2) INGO linkages reduced the likelihood of ratifying the ICESCR
without reservations and also of ratifying Optional Protocol with or without reservations; and
(3) the propensity to sign each treaty declined as the number of ratifications increases. Finally,
the effect of democracy was nearly uniform across treaties and commitment levels.
Not only do different variables account for legally binding commitments and symbolic endorsements, but rates of signature and ratification are inversely related: as the number of countries that ratified the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Optional Protocol increased, rates of signature correspondingly decreased. This relationship between ratification and signature confirms the descriptive trends presented in Fig. 2 and may reflect a “commitment” cascade of sorts (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998): as more countries bound themselves legally to the treaty regimes, fewer countries made nonbinding endorsements.

These results suggest that a treaty’s surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, rather than its content, animate a country’s decision to join. The ICESCR and ICCPR protect different rights, yet the correlates of membership are nearly identical for each. A different set of characteristics accounts for membership to the Optional Protocol. The “crucial difference” is provided by the ICCPR and Optional Protocol. What distinguishes the protocol from its parent treaty is not substantive content—they protect the same rights—but the nature of their monitoring provisions. The Optional Protocol’s individual grievance procedure is much more intrusive than the ICCPR’s interstate grievance procedure. The state-to-state complaint mechanism has never been invoked, presumably because of the generalized sovereignty costs involved: to subject the internal practices and policies of another state to external review is to invite the same level scrutiny of oneself. Because it is unlikely that states will ever violate sovereignty norms in this manner, interstate complaints pose no credible threat and thus do not affect a country’s decision to join the ICCPR. (For this reason it also seems unlikely, pace Blau and Moncada [2007a], that states will prosecute one another’s human rights abuses in domestic courts.) Implementation of the ICCPR is effectively reduced to a reporting requirement comparable to that mandated by the ICESCR.

Assessing the Effects of Individual Covariates

Having surveyed broad patterns of treaty membership and commitment, I turn now to a discussion of individual variables. First, consistent with sociological institutionalism, human rights scores are “decoupled” from rates of treaty membership. Not so with democracy. Democracy scores are a positive and statistically significant predictor of ICESCR, ICCPR, and Optional Protocol membership in all but one model. Because ratification of human rights treaties is presumably costless (or nearly so) for established democracies, their heightened propensity to ratify is consistent with a realist perspective.

The effect of democratization as a temporal process is somewhat more nuanced. Regime liberalization raises the likelihood of ratifying the ICESCR and ICCPR and signing the ICCPR, but is unrelated either to signature or ratification of the Optional Protocol. These results suggest that liberalizing countries will undertake a legal commitment to weakly monitored treaties but are reluctant to join an effectively monitored and enforced treaty in any capacity.
The lock-in thesis proposed by Moravscik (2000) predicts exactly the opposite outcome. Leaders interested in consolidating democratic reforms should seek to bind their successors to the most closely monitored and strongly enforced treaties available.\textsuperscript{12}

A country’s decision to join the covenants was generally unrelated to its normative—that is, ideological and cultural—commitments. During the Cold War, rates of treaty ratification between communist and noncommunist states did not differ, although post-Soviet communist regimes were significantly more likely than other countries to sign the ICESCR and the ICCPR.\textsuperscript{13} None of the communist regimes that persisted after the Soviet Union’s collapse and that remained “at risk” of ratifying the covenants did so by the end of the observation period (as evidenced by the inflated negative coefficients).\textsuperscript{14} The cultural or “civilizational” dimension fares no better than the ideological dimension. Huntington’s (1996) “West versus the rest” thesis implies that Western countries will be more likely than non-Western countries to support human rights treaties. Results indicate that they are not: rates of treaty membership are statistically equivalent for Western and non-Western countries.

Turning next to global-institutional processes, the aggregate number of country-level memberships to INGOs curtails the rate of Optional Protocol ratification. Cole (2006:1925) found that “as the number of INGOs to which a country’s nationals belong increases, the number and rate of petitions filed against it [under the protocol] also increases.” Countries whose citizens participate extensively in INGOs may therefore find it too costly to join the protocol, so the effect is consistent with realism. INGO memberships also had a negative effect on unqualified ratification of the ICESCR, but are otherwise unrelated to rates of treaty membership.

Two additional institutionalist variables, density of signatures and density of ratifications, model the effect of transnational diffusion or density-dependent legitimation processes (Strang and Meyer, 1993). Each additional ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR increases the likelihood of subsequent ratifications, but the cumulative number of signatures has no appreciable effect. The nonsignificant effect of cumulative Optional Protocol ratifications suggests that mimetic pressures do not encourage countries to make hard legal commitments to strongly monitored treaties. Rates of ICESCR and ICCPR ratification—but not Optional Protocol ratification—also increased among newly independent countries. In accordance with sociological institutionalism, new states signaled

\textsuperscript{12} I also tried two alternative ways to operationalize Moravscik’s theory. First I constructed an indicator for new democracies, defined as countries that had been democratic (i.e., a polity score of 6 or higher) for fewer than 10 years. This indicator, when substituted for regime liberalization, did not achieve statistical significance. I also explored a possible interaction between polity scores and regime durability, the latter being a variable that records the number of years since the most recent regime change (defined as a change of three or more points in a country’s polity score over a period of three or fewer years). These interactions were nonsignificant as well.

\textsuperscript{13} This effect should not be overemphasized. Of the three countries in my data set that signed the ICESCR and ICCPR after 1989, only one, China, was communist.

\textsuperscript{14} These countries are Ethiopia (1990–1991), Cuba (1990–), China (1990–), Laos (1990–), Albania (1990), and Yugoslavia (1990–1992).
their support of human rights by ratifying weakly monitored human rights conventions; in line with realism, the same states did not join a closely monitored treaty that might compromise their nascent sovereignty.

**DISCUSSION**

Two main conclusions follow from the foregoing analysis of human rights treaty membership. First, *rates of treaty membership are shaped more by the strength of a treaty's implementation provisions than by its substantive content*. The ICESCR and ICCPR, which enumerate different rights but establish similar implementation mechanisms, exhibit nearly identical patterns of membership; conversely, the ICCPR and Optional Protocol, which protect the same rights but establish different implementation mechanisms, exhibit dissimilar patterns of membership. Second, *rates of treaty membership differ by level of commitment*. The distinction is between “soft” nonbinding endorsements and “hard” legally binding commitments.

How do these findings relate to different theories of treaty membership? No clear and incontrovertible victors emerge, but some perspectives clearly received more support than others. Rates of treaty membership almost always increased as level of democracy increased, but the effect of democratization as a temporal process was confined to ratification of two weakly monitored treaties (the ICESCR and ICCPR). These results are indicative of realism but offer only weak support for liberalism. Human rights scores, perhaps a more direct measure of the congruence between treaty principles and country-level practices, were unrelated to rates of treaty membership, a finding consistent with the institutionalist notion of “decoupling.” Institutionalist arguments also received positive support on two counts: ratification of weakly monitored human rights treaties diffused throughout the world, and newly independent countries were more likely than older countries to ratify the covenants (but not, as expected, the closely monitored protocol). Nevertheless, the hypothesized effect of INGO memberships was absent or, in the case of the Optional Protocol, contradictory to institutionalist expectations. To the extent that INGOs monitor human rights practices, linkages are potentially costly for states and the negative effect can be imputed to realism.

Empirical support for normative perspectives was weak. Two primary indicators of ideological and cultural commitments—communism and the West—had few statistically significant effects; those effects that achieved significance were typically in the direction opposite to what was predicted. Communist countries, for example, had rates of membership to the ICESCR that were equivalent to or lower than membership rates for noncommunist countries, while rates of ICCPR and Optional Protocol membership did not differ for Western and non-Western countries.

On balance, then, realism and institutionalism find more support than either liberalism or constructivism. For constructivists, content alone is
primary: countries join treaties that affirm core ideological or cultural values, irrespective of treaty enforcement. For liberalists, both content and enforcement matter: countries join treaties not merely to affirm democratic values, but also to stabilize and reinforce democratic regime transitions. Contrary to these positions, the decision to join a treaty hinges not on its content but on its implementation. Although realists and institutionalists make different assumptions about countries’ motivations for joining human rights treaties, they agree that countries’ intentions are not always sincere. Content therefore plays a subsidiary role to enforcement in decisions to join. Almost by definition, insincere treaty commitments disregard content, but such commitments are feasible only if compliance is poorly monitored or, if monitored, when countries make nonbinding commitments.

The recent adoption of optional protocols for several core human rights treaties will eventually provide additional opportunities for confirming, revising, or extending the findings presented in this article. Optional protocols to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted respectively in 1999, 2002, and 2006, intensify the monitoring provisions of their parent treaties but do not modify the treaties’ substantive content. In this respect, these treaties and their protocols are similar to the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol. Other protocols augment their treaties’ substantive protections but establish identical implementation mechanisms. This is the case for two optional protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 2000—one on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the other on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. Although too little time has elapsed since the adoption of these supplementary treaties to permit reliable statistical analyses of membership patterns, future research comparing the optional protocols with their parent treaties will help pinpoint the relative impact of treaty content and costs on rates of membership.

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* *p < .05; ** *p < .01; *** *p < .001 (two-tailed).

Notes: Robust standard errors, in parentheses, adjusted for clustering within countries.